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This paper develops a model that incorporates workers’ fair wage preferences into a general 
equilibrium framework with monopolistic competition between heterogeneous firms à la 
Melitz (2003). By assuming that the wage considered to be fair by workers depends on the 
productivity and thus the economic success of the firm they are working in, we can study the 
determinants of profits, involuntary unemployment and within-group wage inequality in a 
unified framework. We use this model to investigate the effects of globalisation. In a 
benchmark case with identical costs of entering domestic and foreign markets, there are gains 
from trade accompanied by distributional conflicts, which have so far not been accounted for 
in the literature: a simultaneous increase of average profits and involuntary unemployment as 
well as a surge in within-group wage inequality. 
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It is by now well established that ﬁrms in all sectors are heterogeneous with respect to
key variables including productivity, size, and export status.1 Given these empirical reg-
ularities, it seems natural to expect that workers would rather work for a successful (i.e.
high-productivity) ﬁrm than for a competitor in the same industry with low productivity.
However, in the established models that account for ﬁrm heterogeneity workers are indiﬀer-
ent between employers because the labour market is assumed to be perfectly competitive,
and hence workers of a given type are paid the same wage in all ﬁrms.2 In this paper, we
develop a framework in which ﬁrm performance matters for workers, as more successful
ﬁrms pay higher wages. This is possible because the labour market is imperfectly com-
petitive. By accounting for the interaction between ﬁrm heterogeneity and labour market
imperfections, our model allows us to shed new light on an issue that is a prime concern
to policy makers and the general public alike: the impact of international competition on
domestic labour markets.3
One tractable framework that allows for ﬁrm heterogeneity in general equilibrium is
given by Melitz (2003). In the Melitz model, active ﬁrms in the market are heterogeneous
with respect to their productivity levels. They supply their output under monopolistic
competition and active ﬁrms make positive proﬁts in equilibrium. We introduce labour
market imperfections into this framework by means of a fair wage-eﬀort mechanism similar
to the one put forward in Akerlof and Yellen (1990).4 The original Akerlof and Yellen
1The empirical literature has provided evidence for a selection of the best ﬁrms into export status
(Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
2Inﬂuential contributions to the theoretical literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms in open economies are
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003).
3See Scheve and Slaughter (2001) for a review of poll data from the U.S. on questions related to
globalisation. They show that critical views held by the general public on this topic are due to the
expectation of negative labour market eﬀects.
4Eﬃciency wages are a standard way to introduce labour market imperfections into models of inter-
national trade. While early contributions have put emphasis on the shirking motive of workers in order
to explain wage rigidity (see Matusz, 1994, 1996), more recent theoretical work has focused on Akerlof’s
(1982) fairness approach (see Kreickemeier and Nelson, 2006; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2007; Grossman
2framework is modiﬁed by introducing a rent-sharing motive as a determinant of workers’
fair wage preferences. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the wage considered to be fair depends
inter alia on the productivity level (and thus the economic success) of the employer.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc component in the fair wage implies that ex ante identical workers earn
diﬀerent wages in equilibrium, with the factor income increasing in the productivity level
of the ﬁrm in which a worker is employed.5
This framework allows us to analyse how the rent-sharing motive of workers inﬂuences
the productivity distribution of active ﬁrms, aggregate output, and average proﬁts in
equilibrium. There are interesting feedback eﬀects on the labour market as well, as the
fair wage-eﬀort mechanism induces not only wage inequality among workers employed in
diﬀerent ﬁrms, but also involuntary unemployment. Having derived the closed economy
equilibrium of our model, we show how fairness preferences and ﬁrm heterogeneity interact
in determining the consequences of trade liberalisation.
Our main results are as follows: In the closed economy equilibrium, we ﬁnd that the
more important the rent sharing motive is in workers’ fair wage preferences, the lower
becomes average productivity, with adverse consequences for total output, average proﬁts
and aggregate employment. Trade liberalisation in the presence of ﬁxed costs of exporting
leads, as in the Melitz model, to a selection of the best ﬁrms into export status and exit of
the least productive producers, thereby inﬂuencing all aggregate variables in the model.
In a benchmark version of the model where ﬁxed costs are the same across all markets, the
self-selection process leads to gains from trade and raises average proﬁts of active ﬁrms.
At the same time, both wage inequality and the unemployment rate increase, thereby
indicating distributional conﬂicts induced by trade liberalisation. A further notable fea-
and Helpman, 2007). There is considerable empirical support for a mechanism of this type, as illustrated
in the review articles by Howitt (2002) and Bewley (2005). Both stress the wide extent and strength
of evidence supporting the fair wage model from a range of sources including: surveys of managers and
workers, ﬁrm-level studies of pay and termination patterns, and experiments.
5Fehr and G¨ achter (2000, p. 172) point out that the idea of gift exchange, which underlies the fair wage-
eﬀort hypothesis, implies that “more proﬁtable ﬁrms pay higher wages”. This supports a ﬁrm internal
reference perspective, with the wage considered to be fair by workers depending on the economic success
of the ﬁrm they are working in.
3ture of our model is the coexistence of involuntary unemployment and positive proﬁts in
equilibrium. This allows us to address an issue that has been of some concern recently
(and perhaps not so recently as well) to many politicians as well as the popular press:
the simultaneous occurrence of increasing proﬁts and increasing unemployment in the face
of globalisation.6 Our results indicate that the selection process among ﬁrms induced by
trade liberalisation is a candidate for explaining such developments.
While existing contributions to the literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms and trade typ-
ically abstract from involuntary unemployment, some look – as we do – at the eﬀect of
trade liberalisation on wage inequality. The focus in these papers is on the diﬀerential
eﬀect that globalisation has on workers that belong to diﬀerent skill groups.7 The model
in the present paper complements the analysis of inter-group relative wage eﬀects by fo-
cussing on the impact that trade has on the wage distribution of ex ante identical workers.
There is well documented evidence across many countries that within-group wage inequal-
ity is important and has increased (see Katz and Autor, 1999; Barth and Lucifora, 2006).
Although the observed increase in within-group wage inequality has been parallel to the
recent surge in intermediate goods trade (usually referred to by the term international
outsourcing), theoretical explanations have so far predominately focussed on two other
sources: technological progress and/or organisational change (see Galor and Moav, 2000;
Aghion, Howitt and Violante, 2002; and Egger and Grossmann, 2005). In this literature
the role of empirically unobservable individual characteristics (like learning abilities, or
analytical and social skills) has been in the centre of interest. By modelling the interaction
of ﬁrm heterogeneity and rent-sharing motives, our analysis identiﬁes a new factor which
may explain the intertemporal pattern of within-group wage inequality: changes in the
6As a case in point, the International Herald Tribune remarks on 11 April 2005 that across wealthy
nations “job creation stalled at a time when corporate proﬁts are soaring.”
7Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) address the impact of trade liberalisation on wage inequality in
a two-country, two-sector, two-factor model with a continuum of heterogeneous ﬁrms. Yeaple (2005) and
Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2006) study the impact of globalisation on the wage distribution in
models where producers, depending on their production technology, hire workers of diﬀerent skill levels.
All three models shed new light on the eﬀect of globalisation on the skill premium.
4composition and relative size of ﬁrms due to trade liberalisation.8
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce a closed economy
version of our model. Section 3 looks at the eﬀect of globalisation in a benchmark version
of the model where ﬁxed costs are the same across all markets. Section 4 addresses the
robustness of our results. First we allow ﬁxed costs to diﬀer between markets, and second
we look at the role of market size eﬀects due to external economies of scale that are
excluded in the main part of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2 Fair Wages and Firm Heterogeneity in a Closed Economy
Consider an economy which is endowed with L units of labour. Two types of goods are
produced: diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and homogeneous ﬁnal output.
2.1 The Model: Basics
Final output is a normalised CES-aggregate of all available intermediate goods. Following








, 0 < ρ < 1, (1)
with the measure of set V representing the mass of available intermediate goods M. In the
(hypothetical) case where the ﬁnal goods sector used an equal quantity q of all intermediate
inputs, the production technology in (1) would yield Y = Mq, and hence increasing
M for a given aggregate level of input would not increase aggregate output. As trade
liberalisation in our model increases the mass of available input varieties, speciﬁcation (1)
eliminates one potential mechanism through which freer trade could inﬂuence aggregate
output, namely external scale eﬀects. This mechanism is well understood, of course, from
Ethier (1982). Closing down this channel of inﬂuence allows us to focus on the eﬀect that
8Waelde and Weiss (2007) analyse the impact of economic integration on within-goup wage inequality
in a setting with homogeneous ﬁrms. They account for diﬀerences of workers with respect to unobservable
individual characteristics and therefore can explain eﬀects of trade liberalisation on wage inequality within
rather than across ﬁrms. In this respect, the ﬁndings of our analysis are complementary to theirs.
5is new and speciﬁc to the heterogeneous ﬁrm literature ` a la Melitz (2003): the impact of
trade liberalisation on the productivity distribution of active ﬁrms.9
We take ﬁnal output as the num´ eraire and assume perfect competition in the ﬁnal










with σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) being the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent varieties of
intermediate goods. Due to the choice of num´ eraire, we have P = 1. Using this normal-
isation, proﬁt maximisation of competitive ﬁnal goods producers leads to the following





At the intermediate goods level, we assume a continuum of ﬁrms, each producing a unique
variety. Output q is linear in labour input l and depends on productivity level φ: q = φl.
Labour input is measured in eﬃciency units, depending on the number of workers and
their eﬀort level. There is a ﬁxed input requirement f for each intermediate good, which
is assumed to consist of invested ﬁnal output Y and will be referred to as beachhead cost
in the following.10 Firms share the same f > 0 but diﬀer in their productivity levels φ.11






with w(φ) denoting the wage paid to a physical unit of labour (a worker) in a ﬁrm with
productivity φ and ε being the eﬀort level provided by workers. Hence, w(φ)/(φε) is the
9We consider a more general production technology that encompasses both the Blanchard-Giavazzi and
Ethier speciﬁcations as special cases in subsection 4.2.
10Beachhead costs are associated with investment that is a prerequisite for serving consumers in a
particular economy (like investment in the local distribution system).
11Expressing ﬁxed cost in terms of ﬁnal output rather than labour (as in Melitz (2003)) is the natural
way to retain the assumption of ﬁxed costs that are the same across ﬁrms in a framework that features
ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates.
6marginal cost of a ﬁrm with productivity level φ, and the price is a constant markup 1/ρ
over marginal cost.
Following Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we assume that workers have a preference for
fairness and condition their eﬀort ε on the wage they are paid relative to the wage they
consider to be fair, ˆ w. If ﬁrms pay at least the fair wage, workers provide the normal level of
eﬀort, which, for notational simplicity, is set equal to one. Eﬀort decreases proportionally
if the wage falls short of the fair wage. Formally, we have ε = min(w/ ˆ w,1), as in Akerlof
and Yellen (1990). Proﬁt maximising ﬁrms have no incentive to pay less than the fair
wage, and hence we can safely assume that they pay ˆ w. This implies ε = 1, and hence
the distinction between workers and eﬃciency units of labour becomes obsolete in the
following.
In line with most of the existing literature on the fairness approach to eﬃciency wages,
we assume that the fair wage is a weighted average of two factors: the ﬁrst one being
ﬁrm-internal and the second one being related to market forces. Similar to Kreickemeier
and Nelson (2006), we associate the second component with the average wage income
per worker, i.e. the average wage of employed workers ( ¯ w) times the employment rate
(1 − U). The ﬁrm-internal component of the reference wage depends on the economic
success (or the “market potential”) of the employer and is given by the productivity of
the ﬁrm an individual is working in, φ.12 In line with Akerlof (1982) and Danthine and
Kurmann (2006), we assume that the reference wage is a geometric average of the above
components:
ˆ w(φ) = φθ[(1 − U) ¯ w]1−θ, (5)
where θ ∈ [0,1] can be interpreted as a fairness (or rent-sharing) parameter. Taking into
account ˆ w(φ) = w(φ), the fair wage speciﬁcation in (5) gives rise to identical wages in all
12Agell and Lundborg (1992, p. 302) note that a worker’s reference set may include the return to the ﬁrm
owner and that in this case the fair wage model provides a simple “explanation for the empirical fact that
workers typically obtain wages that are correlated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁt rates.” In a more recent paper,
Danthine and Kurmann (2006) make the reference wage dependent on output per worker, which equals
φ in our analysis. Crucially, however, these two contributions do not account for productivity diﬀerences
across ﬁrms and product market imperfections.
7ﬁrms if θ = 0 (cf. Melitz, 2003), while wages are ﬁrm-speciﬁc if θ > 0. In the limiting
case of θ = 1, all intermediate goods producers have identical marginal production costs
w(φ)/φ = 1.
The result that more productive ﬁrms pay higher wages is not speciﬁc to our fair
wage formulation in (5). As long as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of the reference wage is
an increasing function of the productivity level, our model leads to wage diﬀerentiation.
However, the simplifying assumption that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component equals the produc-
tivity level is particularly attractive because it allows us discuss the two outcomes no wage
diﬀerentiation and identical marginal production costs as limiting cases of our analysis.13
It should be noted that in line with previous fair-wage models, we implicitly assume that
hiring is a two stage process, with ﬁrms deciding upon wage payments and employment
levels at stage one, and workers deciding upon their eﬀort provision at stage two. As it is
not feasible by assumption to write a contract on the eﬀort provision of workers (because
the individual eﬀort level is not observable), it is not attractive for ﬁrms to accept an
outsider’s oﬀer at stage one to work for a lower wage, as this worker will adjust his fair
wage expectation after being hired by the respective employer.14
2.2 Firm Distribution and Average Productivity
















where ε = 1 has been used. Accounting for (5), we see that the ratios of any two ﬁrms’
wages and prices depend on the ratio of their productivity levels and the fairness parameter
13Although the speciﬁc formulation of the reference wage is not essential for wage diﬀerentiation across
ﬁrms in our model, the eﬃciency wage framework seems to be crucial. For example, Felbermayr and Prat
(2007) ﬁnd that all ﬁrms pay the same wage if unemployment in a Melitz-type model of a closed economy
arises due to search frictions.
14Fehr and Falk (1999) have designed a two stage loboratory experiment to show that the impossiblity to
ﬁx the eﬀort level of workers through a contract is essential for avoiding successful underbidding of wages
by those who are non-employed. Bewley (2005) documents evidence for the reluctance of managers to hire












































with ξ ≡ (σ − 1)(1 − θ). A more productive ﬁrm has a higher output level, pays higher
wages, demands lower prices, and realises higher revenues and proﬁts than a less productive
ﬁrm. The higher is θ, the higher is ceteris paribus the wage diﬀerential and the lower is
the output and revenue diﬀerential between ﬁrms of diﬀering productivities.
The employment level in more productive ﬁrms is higher if and only if ξ > θ and
therefore σ(1−θ)−1 > 0. On the one hand, for any given level of output more productive
ﬁrms need fewer workers. On the other hand, due to lower marginal costs they charge
lower prices and have higher output. For high levels of σ, price diﬀerences between vari-
eties translate into large output diﬀerences, and therefore ﬁrm-level employment increases
with ﬁrm productivity. In contrast, a higher θ increases relative marginal costs of more
productive ﬁrms, thereby mitigating output diﬀerences between producers. Employment
may therefore be lower in more productive ﬁrms.
The positive correlation between productivity levels, proﬁts and wage payments, arising
under fair wage speciﬁcation (5), is well in line with the empirical ﬁndings on rent sharing
in ﬁrms. Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) for example document that a rise in
a sector’s proﬁtability leads to higher wage payments in that sector. And Hildreth and
Oswald (1997) show that changes in proﬁtability induce changes of wages in the same
direction. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence for higher wage payments in, with
respect to their employment levels, larger ﬁrms. Using information from the New Worker
Establishment Characteristics Database, Bayard and Troske (1999) conclude that in the
U.S. “a signiﬁcant portion of the ﬁrm-size wage premium is the result of employees working
9in more productive establishments” (p. 102). Winter-Ebmer and Zweim¨ uller (1999) ﬁnd
that “ﬁrm-size wage diﬀerentials in Switzerland cannot be explained by job-heterogeneity”
and that only “half of the diﬀerential (the size of which is comparable to the diﬀerential
in the United States) is accounted for by worker heterogeneity” (p. 93). These empirical
ﬁndings on ﬁrm (or better employment) size related wage payments are consistent with
the formal relationships in (7) and (9), if a suﬃciently small θ > 0 leads to σ(1−θ)−1 > 0.
In a next step, we determine a weighted average of productivity levels ˜ φ which is
deﬁned in a way to ensure that the quantity q(˜ φ) is equal to the average output per ﬁrm,








where µ(φ) is the distribution of productivity parameters of active ﬁrms over a subset
of (0,∞). From (7), we have p(φ) = p(˜ φ)(φ/˜ φ)θ−1. Substituting into (20) and using







The average productivity ˜ φ gives the weighted harmonic mean of the φs, with relative
output levels q(φ)/q(˜ φ) serving as weights. Denoting by R aggregate revenues in this
economy and by Π aggregate proﬁts we ﬁnd – analogous to Melitz (2003) – that R =
Mr(˜ φ) and Π = Mπ(˜ φ). Together with the previous results P = p(˜ φ) and (by deﬁnition)
Y = Mq(˜ φ), this illustrates the usefulness of the particular average deﬁned in (10): The
aggregate product market variables in our model are identical to what they would be if
the economy hosted M identical ﬁrms with productivity ˜ φ.
2.3 Market Entry and Average Proﬁt
With respect to entry and exit of intermediate goods producers, we follow Melitz (2003)
and assume an unbounded pool of prospective entrants into the intermediate goods market.
Prior to entry, ﬁrms are identical. To enter, ﬁrms must make an initial investment in the
form of fe ≥ 0 units of ﬁnal output. These ﬁxed costs are hereafter sunk. After the
10initial investment, ﬁrms draw their productivity from a cumulative distribution G(φ) with
density g(φ). As in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Baldwin (2005), the Pareto
distribution is used to parametrise G(φ):
G(φ) = 1 − φ−k g(φ) = kφ−(k+1), (11)
where the lower bound of productivities is normalised to 1 without loss of generality (i.e.
φ ≥ 1), and k is a strictly positive parameter.15 A ﬁrm drawing productivity φ will
produce if and only if the expected stream of proﬁts is non-negative. For the sake of
clarity, we should emphasise at this stage the importance of distinguishing the two types
of ﬁxed costs present in the model: initial investment costs fe, which must be incurred
to participate in the productivity draw and may, therefore, be associated with costs of
developing a blueprint; and per-period beachhead costs f, which are associated with entry
into the domestic market and investment in the local distribution system.
If a ﬁrm starts production, it faces a probability of death δ > 0 (exogenous and
independent of φ) in each period. We account for an inﬁnite number of time periods and
focus on steady state equilibria in which the aggregate variables remain constant over















The lowest productivity compatible with a non-negative expected proﬁt stream of a ﬁrm
that chooses to start production is denoted by φ∗. Formally, φ∗ = inf{φ : v(φ) > 0}. From
(12), this implies v(φ∗) = π(φ∗) = 0.















if φ ≥ φ∗
0 otherwise
, (13)
15Using ﬁrm level data for eleven European countries, Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006) show that
“Pareto is a fairly good approximation” (p. 17) of the productivity distribution in their data set.
11where 1−G(φ∗) is the ex ante probability of a successful draw, i.e. a draw that results in







where k > ξ is assumed. The diﬀerential between the average productivity of active ﬁrms
˜ φ and the cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ is therefore only a function of the model parameters σ, θ
and k.
We now turn to the determination of the cutoﬀ productivity φ∗. The free entry condi-
tion requires that in equilibrium the sunk costs fe > 0 of entering the productivity draw
are equal to the present value of the average proﬁts of active ﬁrms, ¯ π ≡ Π/M, multiplied
by the probability of a successful draw, 1−G(φ∗). Formally, using (11), (12) and ¯ π = π(˜ φ),
this gives us the free entry condition (FE)
¯ π = (φ∗)
k δfe. (15)
Clearly, ∂¯ π/∂φ∗ is strictly positive: With a higher cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ – and therefore
a lower probability of getting a favourable draw – a higher average proﬁt is needed to keep
a ﬁrm indiﬀerent between entering and staying out of the productivity draw.
A second relation between the average proﬁt of active ﬁrms and the cutoﬀ productivity
can be derived from the condition that the marginal ﬁrm in the market makes zero proﬁts,
i.e. π(φ∗) = 0. As shown in (6) this implies r(φ∗) = σf, and using (8) and (14) we get the
zero cutoﬀ proﬁt condition (ZCP), which in the case of Pareto distributed productivities
is independent of φ∗:




Figure 1 plots equations (15) and (16). The cutoﬀ productivity level φ∗ is determined by







In order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we clearly need φ∗ > 1, which is the















Figure 1: Determination of the cutoﬀ productivity level
2.4 Welfare, Unemployment and Wage Inequality
We now look at the implication of ﬁrm heterogeneity for the aggregate variables welfare,
unemployment and wage inequality.
In our model with a single homogeneous ﬁnal good, per capita wage income is the
natural utilitarian welfare measure.16 Given the mark-up pricing rule, per capita wage
income is a constant share ρ of per capita output Y/L, and we can therefore use both
variables interchangeably to measure welfare. For notational simplicity, we use per capita
output Y/L in the following. We have (1 − U) ¯ wL = ρY , which can be used to substitute







To determine equilibrium welfare we depict the condition for proﬁt maximisation (4) and
the modiﬁed fair wage constraint (50), both for the average ﬁrm with φ = ˜ φ, in ﬁgure 2.
16By virtue of the free entry condition, the present value of aggregate proﬁts equals total initial invest-
ment of ﬁrms that participate in the productivity draw. Hence, similar to Melitz (2003) only wage income
is disposable for consumption.
13The two curves are labelled PMC and FWC, respectively, and their point of intersection
gives
Y/L = ˜ φρθ/(1−θ). (18)
Due to the normalisation of ﬁnal output in (1), welfare is independent of the mass of
producers M and the total labour endowment L, and therefore changes in market size per









Figure 2: Determination of equilibrium welfare







σ(π(˜ φ) + f)
(19)
Substituting π(˜ φ) from (16) we ﬁnd that M is proportionally increasing in both labour
endowment L and the average productivity level ˜ φ.
In order to determine the rate of unemployment U, we make use of the accounting
identity that aggregate employment (1 − U)L has to equal ﬁrm speciﬁc employment,
14summed over all ﬁrms M. By virtue of (13), we obtain











Using (9) and (14), this can be rewritten as






θ/ξ k − ξ
k − ξ + θ
, (20)
and substituting for Y/L from (18) we get




θ/ξ k − ξ
k − ξ + θ
. (21)
One can immediately see that θ = 0 implies U = 0, showing that having the fair wage
depend on a ﬁrm internal performance measure is necessary in our model to generate
unemployment. With θ > 0, we can ensure that U ∈ (0,1) if k is large enough, implying
that there are relatively many ﬁrms in the market whose productivity is close to the cutoﬀ
level. A suﬃcient condition that holds for all levels of θ ∈ (0,1) is17
k ≥
σ − 1
1 − ρσ−1. (22)
Notably, the unemployment rate in (21) is independent of parameter L. This is a direct
consequence of the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)-type production technology in (1),
which rules out pure market size eﬀects on the key economic variables. That changes in
labour endowments do not have an impact per se, seems to be a plausible outcome as there
is no empirical support for a size pattern in the employment rate, and unemployment is a
problem for large as well as small economies.
We can use (21) as well to gain insights into the distribution of wages in the model. In
the empirical literature, wage rates in diﬀerent percentiles are often compared (90/10 or
50/10) to gain insights on income/wage dispersion between individuals. For the purpose
of analytical tractability, we choose a (slightly) diﬀerent approach and focus on the ratio
17For a given θ, ρ
σ−1k/(k−ξ) ≤ 1 implies RHS ≤ 1 in (21). Since k/(k−ξ) declines in θ, we can derive
(22) as a suﬃcient condition for an interior solution, with RHS ≤ 1 for any possible θ. Condition (22)
is also suﬃcient for w(φ
∗) ≥ (1 − U) ¯ w, implying that employed workers earn at least the average wage
income in the economy.
15of the average to the lowest wage rate, i.e. ¯ w/w(φ∗). This inequality measure is derived
in two steps. From (4) and (5) we know (1−U) = ρθ/(1−θ)w(˜ φ)/ ¯ w. Substituting into (21)







θ/ξ k − ξ
k − ξ + θ
. (23)
This diﬀerential is equal to one if either θ = 0 or θ = ξ. In the former case, this is due to
all ﬁrms paying the same wage. In the latter case ﬁrms pay diﬀerent wages, but the two
averages w(˜ φ) and ¯ w coincide because all ﬁrms have the same employment level, according
to (9). From (7) and (14), we have w(˜ φ)/w(φ∗) = [k/(k − ξ)]θ/ξ. Together with (23), this




k − ξ + θ
k − ξ
. (24)
Importantly, wage inequality is not triggered by diﬀerences in the individual characteristics
of workers. But rather it is the interplay of productivity diﬀerences between ﬁrms and
fairness preferences of workers which leads to wage diﬀerentiation. Since workers are
identical in all respects, ¯ w/w(φ∗) can be interpreted as a measure for the dispersion of
wage income within a particular skill group. A focus on within-group wage inequality
seems also to be justiﬁed from an empirical point of view, as within-group wage inequality
is an important determinant of overall wage inequality (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993;
Katz and Autor18, 1999) and the increase in within-group wage inequality observed in the
last three decades was − in contrast to the rise in between-group wage inequality − not
conﬁned to the U.S. (Katz and Autor, 1999; Barth and Lucifora, 2006).
2.5 The Role of Fairness Preferences
We have shown above that the borderline case θ = 0 leads to the perfectly competitive
labour market outcome in our model: all ﬁrms pay the same wage and there is full em-
ployment. We now turn to more generally determining the eﬀects that changes in θ have
18Katz and Autor (1999, Table 5) show that within-group inequality explains three-fourth of overall
wage inequality in the U.S.
16on average proﬁts, per capita output and the key labour market variables. These eﬀects
are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under parameter restriction (22), a higher θ leads to lower average proﬁts
of active ﬁrms, lower output per capita, higher unemployment and greater wage inequality.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Consider an increase in the fairness pa-
rameter. This improves the relative position of less productive ﬁrms because in relation to
their more productive competitors they now pay lower wages, which mitigates the disad-
vantage they suﬀer from an unfavourable draw in the productivity lottery. Consequently,
less productive ﬁrms than before can now survive in the market, and the cutoﬀ productiv-
ity φ∗ falls. Both the lower cutoﬀ productivity and the steeper wage proﬁle naturally lead
to a widening in the wage diﬀerential and a decline in the average proﬁt of active ﬁrms.
Per capita output falls due to two eﬀects. First, holding the fairness parameter con-
stant, the decrease in the cutoﬀ productivity leads to a proportional decrease in average
productivity and hence per capita output. Second, for a given average productivity the
increase in the fairness parameter increases the fair wage demand in the average ﬁrm, and
per capita output has to fall further in order to make the going wage compatible with the
fair wage constraint, i.e. in order to keep workers – by reducing the average wage income in
the economy – satisﬁed with their wage rate. It is this second-round decline in per capita
output which leads to a fall in aggregate employment. The ﬁrst eﬀect, by reducing per
capita income and the average productivity proportionally, leaves employment constant
(see eq. (20)). There is a further eﬀect on aggregate employment that depends on the size
distribution of ﬁrms in terms of employment levels (which, as shown above, depends on
ξ −θ). While the sign of this eﬀect is ambiguous, we know from proposition 1 that it can
never overturn the primary negative employment eﬀect.
173 A Benchmark Model of the Open Economy
When economists think about integration eﬀects, they often turn to the theoretically ap-
pealing (but empirically not fully convincing) borderline case of full integration of product
markets. Full integration of countries which do not diﬀer in their economic fundamentals
is formally equivalent in our model to an increase in L and, under technology (1), exhibits
no eﬀect on Y/L, U and ¯ w/w(φ∗). Only the number of competitors M rises proportion-
ally with market size parameter L. However, if we account for transport costs the key
macroeconomic variables no longer remain constant in the process of market integration.
This is the case we are focussing on in the following.
Two types of transport costs are distinguished: (i) iceberg transport costs, which are
usually considered in trade models with monopolistic competition, and (ii) ﬁxed transport
costs, which have been put forward by Melitz (2003) to explain the empirical regularity
that larger, more productive ﬁrms engage in exporting. We denote by τ ≥ 1 the iceberg
transport cost parameter and by fx ≥ 0 ﬁxed per-period transport costs, which can
be interpreted as foreign beachhead (market entry) costs and investment in the foreign
distribution system. In analogy to domestic beachhead costs, fx is expressed in units of
ﬁnal output. We investigate integration between n + 1 fully symmetric countries. This
simpliﬁes our analysis and makes country indices obsolete.
We use index x to refer to variables associated with export sales, while domestic
variables are left index free, as in the previous section. Export prices are given by px(φ) =
τp(φ), with p(φ) being determined according to (4). Export sales to any partner country
and the respective revenues at the ﬁrm level are given by qx(φ) = τ−σq(φ) and rx(φ) =
τ1−σr(φ), with q(φ) and r(φ) being determined according to (3) and (6), respectively.





r(φ) if it does not export
r(φ) + nτ1−σr(φ) if it exports
. (25)








18so that πt(φ) = π(φ) + max[0,nπx(φ)] determines the overall (per period) proﬁts of an
active producer.
Similar to Melitz (2003), we can distinguish two scenarios. If trade costs are suﬃciently
low, all active ﬁrms will engage in exporting, i.e. φ∗ = φ∗
x, while partitioning of ﬁrms by
their export status arises under suﬃciently high transport costs. In the latter case φ∗ is
determined by π(φ∗) = 0, while φ∗
x > φ∗ is determined by πx(φ∗
x) = 0. Such a partitioning
of ﬁrms requires πx(φ∗) < 0. Substituting rx(φ) = τ1−σr(φ) into (26), we can see that
all ﬁrms engage in exporting if τσ−1fx ≤ f, whereas τσ−1fx > f leads to partitioning of








and hence we have ˜ φx/˜ φ = φ∗
x/φ∗.
The ex ante probability that a successful entrant will engage in exporting is χ =
[1 − G(φ∗
x)]/[1 − G(φ∗)] = (φ∗/φ∗
x)k. Since ﬁrms know their productivity levels before
they decide upon their export status, χ also gives the ex post fraction of exporters. If all
countries are symmetric, the total number of producers selling to one market is given by
Mt = M(1 + nχ). The weighted average productivity of all ﬁrms active in a particular














1 + nχτ1−σ(˜ φx/˜ φ)ξ
i1/ξ
, (28)
where ˜ φ is the average productivity of all domestic ﬁrms and ˜ φx is the average productivity
of exporting ﬁrms. The diﬀerence between the two averages ˜ φ and ˜ φt is due to two eﬀects:
the lost-in-transit eﬀect caused by goods melting away en route when variable transport
costs are positive and the export-selection eﬀect due to the fact that with partitioning it is
the most productive ﬁrms who export. Inspection of (28) conﬁrms that ˜ φt = ˜ φ when there
are no variable transport costs and all ﬁrms export. Increasing τ decreases ˜ φt/˜ φ directly
due to the lost-in-transit eﬀect, but increases ˜ φt/˜ φ due to the export-selection eﬀect if it
leads to partitioning of ﬁrms by their export status.
19The deﬁnition of ˜ φt in (28) ensures that the quantity produced by the average ﬁrm for
its domestic market, q(˜ φt), is equal to the average output per ﬁrm selling to this market,
Y/Mt. In analogy to the closed economy case, we furthermore have P = p(˜ φt) = 1,
Y = R = Mtr(˜ φt), and Π = Mtπ(˜ φt). Hence, for the open economy version of the model
˜ φt assumes the role that ˜ φ has for the closed economy version.
In the remainder of this section we look at the case where the per-period domestic
beachhead costs f and the per-period foreign beachhead costs fx are equal. This ensures
partitioning of ﬁrms according to their export status – the empirically relevant case – for
any strictly positive level of iceberg transport costs (τ > 1). Making the model symmetric
in this way allows us to bring to the forefront the role played by ﬁrm heterogeneity in the
globalisation process. We delegate a discussion of the general case f 6= fx to section 4.
With the assumption fx = f, and using (8) as well as r(φ∗) = σf and rx(φ∗
x) = σfx (from















Substitution in (28) gives ˜ φt = ˜ φ, where the diﬀerential of the two average productivities
is independent of τ because with fx = f the lost-in-transit eﬀect and the export-selection
eﬀect exactly oﬀset each other. This simpliﬁes the analysis dramatically because the
relative size of φ∗ and ˜ φ depends only on model parameters σ, θ and k, as shown in (14),
and is the same in the closed and open economy. We can therefore focus on deriving the
eﬀect that opening up to trade has on the cutoﬀ productivity φ∗. We can furthermore see
from (16) that π(˜ φ), the proﬁt that the average ﬁrm makes in its domestic market, does
only depend on model parameters f,σ,θ,k and therefore remains unaﬀected after trade
liberalisation.
3.1 Comparing Autarky and Trade
From the deﬁnition of average productivity ˜ φt, the average proﬁt of active ﬁrms ¯ πt ≡ Π/M
in the open economy is given by ¯ πt = π(˜ φt)(Mt/M) = π(˜ φt)(1+nχ), where χ = τ−k/(1−θ).




= 1 + nχ > 1. (30)
Hence, average proﬁts of active ﬁrms increase as the economy opens up to trade.
As shown above, φ∗ is jointly determined by the free entry condition and the zero
cutoﬀ proﬁt condition. The free entry condition is the same as in the closed economy,




(1 + nχ), (31)
using (16) as well as ˜ φt = ˜ φ. Together, (15) and (31) determine the cutoﬀ productivity









Comparing φ∗ to its autarky level φ∗
a as determined in (17), we see that trade liberalisation
leads to a higher productivity cutoﬀ level: φ∗ > φ∗
a. Graphically, trade liberalisation
induces an upward shift of the ZCP locus in ﬁgure 1. With the FE curve unchanged, the
cutoﬀ productivity increases.
As the ratio of average productivity ˜ φ and cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ is the same under
autarky and trade, and we have ˜ φ = ˜ φt, it follows from (17) and (32) that
˜ φt
˜ φa
= (1 + nχ)
1/k > 1 (33)
Hence, in the completely symmetric case considered here trade liberalisation induces an
increase in the average productivity level of active ﬁrms: ˜ φt > ˜ φa. This translates into an
increase in per capita production – and therefore welfare – for all trading economies, as
shown by (18).20
19From now on, we use subscript a to refer to autarky levels.
20While under production technology (1) the welfare eﬀect is independent of the change in the mass of
intermediates used in each country, it is straightforward to determine this change. In the open economy,
we denote by Mt the mass of input varieties used in ﬁnal goods production, and by M the mass of locally
produced varieties. Noting r(˜ φt) = r(˜ φa) and Y = Mtr(˜ φt), Mt/Ma = ˜ φt/˜ φa > 1 follows immediately
from (19) and (33). Hence, in each country more varieties are used in production after trade liberalisation.
The mass of local producers on the other hand declines if and only if k > 1: Use (33) and Mt = (1+nχ)M
to get M/Ma = (1 + nχ)
(1−k)/k. Note that k > 1 is not implied by (22).
21We now turn to the eﬀects of trade liberalisation on unemployment. Summing up
employment at the ﬁrm level we get























where l(φ) is the employment in a domestic ﬁrm of productivity φ for its domestic sales,
while lx(φ) = τ1−σl(φ) is the employment in a domestic exporting ﬁrm of productivity φ
for its export production. This can be rewritten as






θ/ξ k − ξ











Substituting for Y/L from (18) we get




θ/ξ k − ξ
k − ξ + θ
, (37)
Comparing (21) with (37), we see that the move from autarky to trade increases unem-
ployment. The results on average proﬁts, aggregate welfare and unemployment can be
summarised as follows:
Proposition 2. With positive variable transport costs and beachhead costs that are the
same across all markets, opening up to international trade increases average proﬁts of
active ﬁrms, aggregate welfare and the rate of unemployment in the participating countries.
The intuition for these results is as follows. On the one hand, opening up for trade raises,
all other things equal, the mass of available intermediate good varieties in each market.
This fosters competition in the local market and reduces demand at the ﬁrm level (see
(3)). The decline in demand renders production of marginal ﬁrms (with productivity
levels close to φ∗
a) unproﬁtable. On the other hand, due to relatively cheap intermediate
imports from foreign high-productivity ﬁrms, aggregate output of the ﬁnal good increases,
thereby increasing aggregate labour income and – via the fair wage constraint (50) – the fair
22wage for all ﬁrms. Since a higher wage reduces proﬁts ceteris paribus (see (6)), this reduces
proﬁtability further and contributes to the exit of marginal ﬁrms.21 As a consequence, only
the more productive ﬁrms survive under openness, the most productive ﬁrms export and
consequently become bigger, and both average proﬁts and average productivity increase.
By virtue of equation (18), this leads to higher per capita output and therefore higher
aggregate welfare.
The aggregate employment eﬀect of trade liberalisation is driven by two eﬀects that
work in opposite directions. On the one hand, production of intermediate inputs increases,
and with labour as the only input this increases aggregate employment, ceteris paribus.
On the other hand, average ﬁrm productivity increases, and hence fewer workers are
needed to produce a given quantity of intermediates. In the limiting case of zero variable
transport costs (τ = 1) the output eﬀect and the productivity eﬀect exactly oﬀset each
other, and globalisation has no eﬀect on aggregate employment. With positive variable
transport cost, the case considered here, the productivity eﬀect dominates, and aggregate
employment falls.
With welfare and employment eﬀects at hand, we now show how a movement from
autarky to trade aﬀects wage payments, starting with the wage of the average worker,
¯ w = ρ(Y/L)/(1 − U). From proposition 2, per capita output rises while the employment
rate declines, and hence ¯ w increases unambiguously. However, there are also distributional
consequences through changes in the wage dispersion. The wage diﬀerential between the
worker receiving the average wage and the lowest paid worker can be derived in analogy
to the autarky case. It is given by
¯ w
w(φ∗)
= Γ−1k − ξ + θ
k − ξ
. (38)
Comparing ¯ w/w(φ∗) with its autarky level in (24), we see that wage inequality rises if
21In the original Melitz model, both eﬀects are captured by the eﬀect of globalisation on the price index:
The fall in the CES price index due to the increase in the mass of competitors leads to a decrease in
demand at the ﬁrm level, see Melitz (2003, eq. (2)). This can be interpreted as a competition eﬀect, as in
our model, or as an increase in the real wage paid by all ﬁrms, which in his model equals 1/P due to the
normalisation of the nominal wage to one.
23an economy moves from autarky to trade in the presence of positive variable transport
costs (so that Γ < 1). Intuitively, the increase in cutoﬀ productivity increases both per
capita output and the wage paid by the marginal ﬁrm proportionally. As unemployment
increases, the average wage of those employed increases more than proportionally, and
¯ w/w(φ∗) rises. The wage eﬀects of trade liberalisation are summarised in proposition 3.
Proposition 3. With positive variable transport costs and beachhead costs that are the
same across all markets, opening up to trade raises the average wage and widens the wage
diﬀerential ¯ w/w(φ∗) in all participating countries.
This proposition gives new insights into the distributional consequences of trade liberal-
isation. While existing theoretical studies on that issue investigate the eﬀects on wages
of one skill group relative to another one, our model emphasises the wage dispersion
eﬀects within education/skill groups (as all workers have the same individual character-
istics). The model points to the role of trade liberalisation as a candidate for explaining
the observed increase of within-group wage inequality if productivity diﬀerences of ﬁrms
paired with fairness preferences give rise to ﬁrm-speciﬁc payments to labour. This eﬀect
is triggered by a change in the composition and relative size of ﬁrms that diﬀer in their
productivity levels.22 To the best of our knowledge, there exists no conclusive empirical
evidence on the role of trade liberalisation for within-group wage inequality. However,
Bernard and Jensen (1995) ﬁnd that exporters pay higher wages (for both production
and non-production workers), even if controlling for plant size, capital intensity, hours
per worker, industry and location. This gives (at least indirect) support for the economic
mechanisms in this paper.23
22While the change in composition of domestic ﬁrms raises w(˜ φ) and w(φ
∗) pari passu, without aﬀecting
the ratio of these two wage rates, the separation of ﬁrms according to their export status and the associated
impact on the size of exporters relative to non-exporters induces an increase in the ratio of ¯ w to w(˜ φ). It
is this second compositional eﬀect due to selection of the most productive ﬁrms into export status which
is responsible for the wage inequality eﬀect of trade liberalisation in our analysis.
23It is straightforward to show that quantitatively the eﬀect of trade liberalisation on the key model
variables described in propositions 2 and 3 depends on fairness preferences: The higher is θ, the smaller
is the positive eﬀect of trade liberalisation on welfare and the average proﬁt, and the larger are – subject
243.2 Marginal Trade Liberalisation
Comparing the two scenarios of autarky and (restricted) trade, as we have done in the
previous section, is analytically convenient but clearly does not adequately reﬂect the
globalisation experience of the past decades, which has arguably been a gradual process. In
the last twenty years more and more countries have opened their borders for international
goods transactions and transport costs have fallen dramatically since World War II, leading
some observers to proclaim the “death of distance” (Cairncross, 1997) to be imminent.
To gain insights into the development of unemployment and wage inequality during the
process of globalisation, we analyze the comparative static eﬀects of changes in transport
costs τ and the number of trading partners n. As in the last section, we look at the fully
symmetric case where fx = f. This implies χ = τ−k/(1−θ) with ∂χ/∂τ < 0, and hence
the proportion of ﬁrms that export increases with falling variable trading costs, as can be
expected. Using this result, we ﬁnd that a decrease in τ increases average productivity ˜ φt
(from (33)) and therefore per capita output (from (18)). The same equations can be used
to see that average productivity and per capita output increase in the number of partner
countries n. This result is not surprising, as trade liberalisation per se has a positive eﬀect
on welfare. This eﬀect is reinforced if more countries become economically integrated.
The eﬀect of trade liberalisation in the form of either lowering τ or increasing n on
unemployment and the wage diﬀerential are determined by their respective eﬀects on Γ,
as can be seen from (37) and (38). Partially diﬀerentiating (36), we ﬁnd ∂Γ/∂n < 0, and
therefore an increase in the number of trading partners raises unemployment as well as the
wage diﬀerential ¯ w/w(φ∗). On the other hand, the eﬀect of changes in variable transport
costs on Γ is non-monotonic. This follows from the result established earlier that the
employment level in an integrated world with zero variable transport costs (τ = 1) is
equal to the autarky situation (which follows if τ → ∞), while employment falls if one
to only mild conditions – the negative eﬀects on employment and wage inequality. The results on welfare
and the average proﬁt follow from (16), (31) and (33), noting that ∂χ/∂θ < 0. It has been shown above
that both the employment and wage inequality eﬀects of trade liberalisation are solely determined by Γ.
We ﬁnd that k > 1 is suﬃcient for dΓ/dθ < 0, and hence the stated result follows. (Derivation details are
available from the authors upon request.)
25moves from autarky to trade with positive variable transport costs (τ > 1). Diﬀerentiating
















which allows us to identify a critical ¯ τ > 1, such that ∂Γ/∂τ > 0 if τ > ¯ τ and ∂Γ/∂τ < 0
if τ < ¯ τ. A marginal reduction in variable transport costs increases (decreases) unemploy-
ment and wage inequality if τ is larger (smaller) than ¯ τ.
The results derived so far allow us to address an issue that has featured prominently
in both the political debate and the popular press in recent years: the simultaneous
occurrence of increasing proﬁts and increasing unemployment in the face of globalisation.
Is there a reason to believe that these two phenomena are related? Our framework suggests
that the decline in transport costs could be a common cause for both phenomena, and
indeed might in addition have contributed to the increase in wage inequality. Notably
however, the phenomenon that employment and ﬁrm proﬁts move in opposite directions
in our model disappears for low levels of transport costs. While further globalisation
hence would have the potential for further increasing the proﬁts of active ﬁrms, it should
eventually, as the “death of distance” becomes a reality, lead to an increase in employment
as well.
4 Extensions
The analysis in section 3 has built upon two important assumptions, namely (i) identical
beachhead costs for domestic and foreign markets and (ii) no external economies of scale,
due to our normalisation of the CES-aggregator in (1). We now check the robustness
of our results by modifying these two model elements. In subsection 4.1, we allow for
heterogeneous beachhead costs but keep the normalisation of the CES-aggregator. The
role of external economies of scale is analysed in subsection 4.2.
264.1 Heterogeneous Beachhead Costs
In this subsection, we look at the case where beachhead costs for domestic and export
markets are diﬀerent. There is no presumption as to which of these costs one should
expect to be higher (which is what makes the benchmark case of fx = f interesting to
begin with), and hence we will consider both fx > f and fx < f. The analysis in this
section is conﬁned to deriving the eﬀects of a movement from autarky to trade, i.e. an
adaptation of the analysis in section 3.1 for the case of asymmetric beachhead costs. The










with χ = 1 if τσ−1fx ≤ f. The productivity diﬀerential ˜ φt/˜ φa determining the welfare


























if τσ−1fx > f
, (330)
with the ﬁrst term at the right-hand side of (330) being equal to ˜ φt/˜ φ and the second
term equalling φ∗/φ∗
a (or, equivalently, ˜ φ/˜ φa). The eﬀect of globalisation on aggregate























if τσ−1fx > f
. (360)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side in both lines of (360) equals (˜ φt/˜ φ)θ, and the second
term in line two is smaller than or equal to one (as χ ≤ 1).
For simplicity, we start by looking at the eﬀects of globalisation for the borderline
case of zero ﬁxed and variable transport costs (fx = 0, τ = 1). As mentioned before and
conﬁrmed by inspection of (330) and (360), goods market integration in this case leaves
welfare and employment unaﬀected. Now, increasing τ leaves relative cutoﬀ productivities
27φ∗/φ∗
a unchanged, but decreases ˜ φt/˜ φ due to the lost-in-transit eﬀect. Overall, welfare and
aggregate employment decrease. On the other hand, with fx > 0 we have φ∗/φ∗
a > 1 and
in addition ˜ φt/˜ φ > 1 due to the export-selection eﬀect once the partitioning threshold is
reached. Overall, welfare increases. Employment remains unchanged below the partition-
ing threshold, as it only depends on ˜ φt/˜ φ, but not on φ∗/φ∗
a. In the partitioning regime,
the employment eﬀect may be positive or negative, depending on the particular parameter
constellation.
With both ﬁxed and variable transport costs strictly positive, the eﬀects just described
interact, and the overall welfare and employment eﬀects depend ceteris paribus on the rel-
ative size of these costs. Rather than going through an unwieldy catalogue of cases, we
focus on some insights that can be gained directly from inspecting (330) and (360). Firstly,
higher variable transport costs reduce welfare and employment if there is no partition-
ing of ﬁrms. Hence, there is a tendency of globalisation to exhibit detrimental welfare
and employment eﬀects if variable transport costs are high and foreign beachhead costs
are moderate. Secondly, fx > f is suﬃcient for positive welfare eﬀects and necessary
for positive employment eﬀects of globalisation.24 Thus, there is a tendency for trade
liberalisation to be beneﬁcial if foreign beachhead costs are suﬃciently high and there is
partitioning of ﬁrms by their export status.
4.2 External Economies of Scale
This subsection addresses the impact of external economies of scale on the trade liberal-










, 0 < ρ < 1, η ∈ [0,1]. (10)
24It is diﬃcult to show positive employment eﬀects of globalisation analytically. However, numerical
simulation exercises indicate that such positive employment eﬀects are possible if there is partitioning of
ﬁrms by their export status.
25See Montagna (2001) for a similar exercise in a heterogeneous ﬁrms model without labour market
imperfections.
28This production technology covers our speciﬁcation without external scale eﬀects (η = 1)
and the standard speciﬁcation of the CES technology as used by Ethier (1982) (η = 0) as
two special cases. The existence of external scale eﬀects (for η < 1) drives a wedge between
the price index P, which is normalised to one, and the price of the ﬁrm with average
productivity, which is given by p(˜ φ) = M
1−η
σ−1. By virtue of (50), this has consequences for
per capita output, and hence welfare:
Y/L = ˜ φρθ/(1−θ)M(1−η)/ξ, (180)
which depends positively on the mass of available input varieties M if η < 1. Hence, to the
extent that the mass of available input varieties increases with country size (measured by
aggregate labour supply), larger countries have higher welfare. In order to ensure stability
of the autarky equilibrium we assume ξ > 1 − η.26
Using (180), the equilibrium mass of available intermediate goods can be determined














In contrast to our benchmark model, a higher labour endowment L now leads to a more
than proportional increase in the mass of available input varieties.
With respect to the unemployment rate, we obtain
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which simpliﬁes to (21) if η = 1. In contrast, with η < 1 the unemployment rate exhibits
a size pattern: The higher the labour endowment L, the greater an economy’s mass of
available input varieties and the lower is its unemployment rate (under autarky). For an
interior solution with U < 1, the endowment of labour must be suﬃciently low. This is
assumed in the following.
26In the opposite case of ξ < 1 − η, a marginal increase of M (above Ma) would raise per capita output
more than proportionally, thereby leading to further entry (due to M = Y/r(˜ φ)) and ultimately driving
both welfare and the mass of intermediate competitors up to inﬁnity.
29The ﬁnal variable of interest is within-group wage inequality ¯ w/w(φ∗). Noting that
w(˜ φ)/w(φ∗) is a constant if productivity levels are Pareto-distributed, we can investigate
the role of market size by looking at w(˜ φ)/ ¯ w. By virtue of fair wage condition (5), we have
w(˜ φ)/ ¯ w = (1 − U)[w(˜ φ)/˜ φ]−θ/(1−θ) which, using w(˜ φ)/˜ φ = ρp(˜ φ) = ρM
1−η
σ−1 together with
(210), turns out to be identical to (23). As a consequence, within-group wage inequality
in (24) remains unaﬀected by the generalisation considered in this subsection.
We can now compare the autarky to the trade equilibrium, focussing, as in section 3,
on the symmetric case of identical beachhead costs in all markets: f = fx. There are two
channels through which trade liberalisation aﬀects welfare. First, there are productivity
gains, as the least productive ﬁrms leave the market: ˜ φt > ˜ φa (see section 3). Second,
the number of available input varieties goes up after trade liberalisation27 (Mt > Ma),
which with η < 1 increases welfare further. Concerning wage inequality, we know from the
autarky scenario that the generalisation of production technology (1) has no implication
for the relative wage ¯ w/w(φ∗). Hence, the ﬁnding that a movement from autarky to trade
ampliﬁes wage inequality survives for all possible η-values.
Finally, following the analysis in section 3, the employment rate in the trade scenario
can be reformulated in the following way:
1 − U = (1 − Ua)Γ(Mt/Ma)
θ(1−η)/ξ . (370)
There are two counteracting eﬀects of trade liberalisation on the unemployment rate U.
On the one hand, unemployment increases due to partitioning of ﬁrms by their export
status (see section 3). On the other hand, there are additional positive labour demand
eﬀects if η < 1 leads to external scale eﬀects. Which of the two eﬀects dominates critically
depends on the size of transport costs τ and parameter η. In the borderline case of zero
variable transport costs τ = 1, we have Γ = 1 and the partitioning eﬀect vanishes. Thus,
employment unambiguously increases after trade liberalisation through the second channel
of inﬂuence. In contrast, if τ > 1 and the external scale eﬀect is suﬃciently weak, i.e. if
27Substitute ˜ φt for ˜ φ and Mt for M in (19
0) and consider ξ > 1−η. Then, Mt > Ma follows immediately
from ˜ φt > ˜ φa.
30η is not too low, it is the ﬁrst eﬀect that dominates and the unemployment rate is higher
under trade than under autarky.28
Summing up, we ﬁnd that the results in section 3 for the impact of trade liberalisation
on welfare and wage inequality are robust with respect to diﬀerent degrees of external scale
eﬀects. However, our conclusions from the previous analysis on the unemployment eﬀects
of trade liberalisation have to be modiﬁed. A negative employment eﬀect is triggered if
variable transport costs are not too low and the external scale eﬀects are moderate, while
a positive employment eﬀect can be expected if variable transport costs are negligible and
the external scale eﬀect is particularly strong.29
5 Concluding remarks
The role of globalisation for labour market performance has featured prominently in the
economics debate for a long time. While the eﬀect of trade liberalisation on the skill
premium has been at the forefront of this debate, its eﬀect on wage inequality between
workers of the same skill group has been ignored. To address this issue, we develop a
model that incorporates a fair wage mechanism into a general equilibrium framework with
heterogeneous ﬁrms that diﬀer in their productivity levels. Furthermore, we assume that
rent-sharing motives are a determinant of workers’ fair wage preferences, so that wage
payments contain a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component. This gives a theoretical framework in which
within-group wage inequality and unemployment are determined simultaneously, with the
productivity distribution of active ﬁrms being a key factor of the labour market outcome.
We then use this model to study the eﬀects of international integration of goods markets
28It is noteworthy that U > Ua is possible even if η = 0.
29It is interesting to compare this result with the respective ﬁndings by Matusz (1996), who analyses
the labour market eﬀects of trade liberalisation in an Ethier (1982)-type framework with a Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) model of eﬃciency wages. In this setting, trade liberalisation increases productivity and
leads to higher real wages and higher employment. Matusz (1996) conducts his analysis in a setting without
variable transport costs. In this case, our extended model with scale eﬀects would also result in a higher
employment level after trade liberalisation. However, if we allow for existence of variable transport costs,
positive employment eﬀects are no longer guaranteed in our framework.
31on national labour markets.
Noting from previous theoretical work that economic integration aﬀects the produc-
tivity distribution of active producers, we have been particularly interested in how these
changes translate into per capita output, unemployment and within-group wage inequality
eﬀects. In our fully symmetric benchmark model where domestic and foreign beachhead
(market entry) costs are the same, there are gains from trade accompanied by higher
average proﬁts, higher unemployment and a larger wage dispersion. This highlights two
distributional conﬂicts national governments face in the process of globalisation: One is
due to the simultaneous occurrence of higher average proﬁts and higher unemployment.
The second distributional conﬂict arises between workers employed by diﬀerent ﬁrms:
Those who stay employed beneﬁt to diﬀerent extents from the gains from trade, while
those who become newly unemployed lose.
In one extension to our basic setting we allow for diﬀerences in the costs of domestic
and foreign market entry. In this more general setting, two important results have been
identiﬁed: If foreign beachhead costs are suﬃciently high, in addition to there being gains
from trade economic integration may reduce both within-group wage inequality and the
unemployment rate. However, if foreign beachhead costs are low, trade liberalisation may
reduce per capita output and welfare. In this case, both within-group wage inequality and
the unemployment rate deﬁnitely increase.
In future work our framework can be extended in a number of directions. For one, it
would be potentially fruitful to introduce trade policy instruments into the model and to
look at their eﬀect on welfare and the labour market. Another promising area for future
research is the addition of a second factor of production that would allow the simultaneous
discussion of within-group and between-group wage inequality.
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Proof of Proposition 1














which given that ρ ∈ (0,1) is negative if d˜ φ/dθ < 0. Substituting (17) into (14) and

































k(k − ξ)2 < 0.
Together with limk→∞ Ω(k,ξ) = 0, this implies that Ω(k,ξ) > 0 for any k ∈ (ξ,∞). Noting
further that dφ∗/dξ > 0 (from (17)) and dξ/dθ = −(σ − 1) < 0, we have d˜ φ/dθ < 0 and
thus d(Y/L)/dθ < 0.
Third, diﬀerentiating (21) with respect to θ gives
d(1 − U)
dθ




















k − (σ − 1)
k + 1 − σ(1 − θ)
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k − (σ − 1)
(k − ξ)2 ,
which is positive, due to inequality (22).
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